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The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, is likely to deter-
mine the future direction of the institutional framework for sustainable development and for 
international environmental governance. As states move toward the “sharp end” of their nego-
tiations, it is important to analyze some of the risks and benefits of the identified options for the 
reform of international environmental governance and offer pragmatic ideas on how to make 
best use of existing resources and structures.
In the current intergovernmental debates on the institutional framework for sustainable 
development, the environmental dimension is the subject of particular attention. More 
specifically, there is general agreement that: the international environmental governance 
system is not adequately fulfilling its objectives and functions; environmental governance 
reform should be addressed in the broader context of environmental sustainability and sus-
tainable development; and the status quo is not an option. 
Governments have developed ideas for institutional redesign over the past twenty years. 
They launched the latest rounds of negotiations, the so-called Belgrade Process, at the 
twenty-fifth session of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing 
Council in 2009, followed by a decision to continue the process in 2010.1 The overall process 
resulted in a set of reform options regarding form and function, which are outlined in the 
Belgrade Process “Set of options for improving international environmental governance” 
and the “Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome” documents and include:2 
a. Enhancing UNEP
b. Establishing a new umbrella organization for sustainable development
c. Establishing a specialized agency such as a world environment organization
d. Reforming the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the United  
 Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
e. Enhancing institutional reforms and streamlining existing structures
These options differ in the specific institutional structures that would be established or 
modified. Options (a) and (c) focus specifically on the environmental governance architec-
ture, through UNEP or a successor organization. The other options address the wider sus-
tainable development architecture, which is beyond the scope of this issue brief. Regard-
less of any changes in the wider architecture, one of the two UNEP-related options may 
be adopted at the upcoming United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
2012, commonly known as “Rio+20.”3 These two options will differ in several respects, 
including: their negotiating tracks; the effort required to implement the negotiated 
outcome; and how the United Nations (UN) system addresses the environment.
However, the structural and procedural differences between the options do not fully 
encapsulate the range of functional issues which reform should address. Functional 
objectives are outlined in the Belgrade Process outcome; the ability of an enhanced 
UNEP or successor organization to meet these objectives will depend not only 
on which option is chosen, but on a range of architectural features, in particular 
the entity’s relationship with other bodies such as the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and the diverse multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs). Such architectural details need to be discussed and decided 
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with their objectives in mind. As originally agreed when the 
current governance architecture was established in 1972, “form 
should follow function.”4 This brief examines the links between 
structural reform and functional outcomes. It presents an over-
view of the procedural and structural differences between the 
two UNEP-related reform options and offers some ideas on en-
abling a reformed institutional architecture to meet its func-
tional objectives.
Reform of Institutional Structure: Specialized 
Agency vs. Subsidiary Body
The two main institutional alternatives under political consid-
eration include a specialized agency of the UN, such as a World 
Environment Organisation (WEO) or a UN Environment Or-
ganisation (UNEO5), or an enhanced UNEP, which would retain 
its current status as a subsidiary body of the UNGA. The two al-
ternatives differ in the legal instruments of their creation, their 
level of independence, their relationship with the rest of the 
UN system, as well as their membership and funding sources. 
Some of these differences are summarized in the table below, 
and others are discussed further below.
Common to both options is that they will require a negotiated 
outcome between states. States will determine the mandate, 
authority, and financing of any institutional form that is adopt-
ed. Such negotiations could occur directly or indirectly within 
the UNGA, or outside of it.
Specialized Agency
The rationale often stated for creating a specialized agency is 
to use 21st-century institutional models to respond to 21st-
century challenges, and to achieve equivalency with other enti-
ties such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) (est. 
1919), World Bank (est. 1944), Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (est. 1945), UNESCO (est. 1946), World Health Organization 
(est. 1948), and World Trade Organization (est. 1995).
The governance of the specialized agency would be deter-
mined through its negotiation process, which would result in 
the adoption of a treaty, and its relationship to the UN would 
be determined by Article 57 of the UN Charter. A specialized 
agency would not fall under the authority of the UNGA or the 
UN programmatic or budgetary processes, and would have to 
create its own administrative regulations and rules (or explic-
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1 Individual states may or may not be party to an organization’s treaty, and historically have sometimes even withdrawn from and later rejoined 
some organizations.
2 Interestingly, UNIDO was originally established in 1966 as “an organ of the UNGA” and functioned as an “autonomous organization,”  
although this has not been repeated.
3 Approximately US$6 million per year. UNEP’s administrative costs are also reduced through direct and indirect administrative support from 
UNON, e.g., support for meetings of the Governing Council, security, etc., the precise value of which has not been fully calculated, but direct 
regular budget support may be between US$10-20 million per year (UNON).
 Specialized Agency  Subsidiary Entity of UNGA
Specific treaty negotiated between states under 
the auspices of the UNGA or independently 
thereof 
UNGA resolution (to establish or modify 
a subsidiary body), e.g., Resolution 2997 
establishing UNEP
Open to all states but dependent on their 
ratification of the organization’s treaty. 
Universal membership is possible (and is an 
aspiration) but cannot be guaranteed1 
Universal membership through the UNGA, 
although membership of its governing body 
may be universal or limited, e.g., UNEP Governing 
Council (GC), which currently has 58 members
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) with 173 State Parties, 
created in 19852; outside the UN system, the 
International Renewable Energy Agency, with 
75 State Parties (and the EU), was created  
in 2009 
UN Women, created in 2010; UN Human Rights 
Council, created in 2006. Neither entity has a 
governing body with universal membership 
Usually through assessed contributions from 
member states; no funding from regular UN 
budget 
Some funding from UN regular budget (for 
example, 4% of UNEP’s current budget plus 
direct and indirect support through the UN 








itly adopt UNGA regulations and rules). It would be an author-
ity unto itself, and would not need any further approval to ei-
ther take or implement decisions within its mandate, which is 
a defining feature of this option. However, if the agency has less 
than universal membership, this will have implications for its 
financing and perceived authority.
While reference is often made to the “upgrading of UNEP into a 
specialized agency,” the creation of a specialized agency would 
not in itself abolish UNEP. Since UNEP is a programme of the 
UNGA, it would be for the General Assembly to determine the 
fate of UNEP. Issues such as these would need to be resolved 
through the negotiation process.
Subsidiary Body of the UN General Assembly
Whether UNEP is retained and enhanced, or re-created, there 
is wide scope available to the UNGA for the specific governance 
structure it establishes for a subsidiary entity, as is evident from 
a review of existing entities such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNITAR, 
UNAIDS, the Human Rights Council, UN Women – or UNIDO 
as it existed under the UNGA prior to becoming a specialized 
agency. The 58-member UNEP Governing Council could be ex-
panded, for instance, or some of its responsibilities reassigned.
The UNGA can enable an entity to address matters within its 
competence without further approval by the UNGA, and can 
prescribe the voting process of the entity, or leave it to the en-
tity itself to determine. It can also empower a subsidiary entity 
to create its own rules and to further expand on relevant UN 
rules, including human resources policies, provided they are 
consistent with the UNGA-approved regulations. Such an en-
tity would, however, remain under the general authority of the 
UNGA.
A subsidiary entity of the UN has a direct relationship with the 
UN and its other subsidiary bodies, and is linked to the wider 
sustainable development agenda, including through the review 
of its budget and program by processes established for most UN 
funds and programmes (noting that all exclusively voluntarily 
funded entities are excluded from the UNGA Committee on Pro-
gramme and Coordination6). It would also remain open to the 
UNGA to further modify the mandate of a subsidiary body over 
time by resolution as necessary, as has occurred with UNEP.
Some Significant Changes since the Establishment 
of UNEP in 1972
 Membership of the UN has grown from 132 states in 1972 to 
193 in 2011 (the UNEP Governing Council still comprises 58 
states, as in 1972 – 44% of total UNGA membership in 1972 
but 30% in 2012). Membership in multilateral environmen-
tal agreements has also grown dramatically, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.
 Environment ministries and related portfolios have been 
created across all countries.
 There are now 500+ MEAs, although most of these are regional 
agreements, such as river basin management organizations. 
In discussing international environmental governance, we 
are primarily concerned with the approximately 12-15 global 
MEAs with universal – or near universal – membership: UN-
FCCC, UNCCD, CBD, and Montreal Protocol have 192+ par-
ties; WHC 182 parties; CITES 175 parties; etc. Most of these 
(but not all) hold meetings of the Conferences of the Parties 
(COP) every two years.
 New financial mechanisms have been established, most im-
portantly the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with 182 
State parties, and the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal 
Protocol, with 196 parties.
 Environment is built into the programs of multiple UN and 
other international entities, such as the World Bank, INTER-
POL, WTO, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, etc. (42 in total).
 Civil society involvement has blossomed, with major NGOs 
such as Conservation International, the Nature Conservan-
cy, and WWF having multimillion-dollar budgets, and NGOs 
collectively having billion-dollar budgets.
 The private sector is engaged with and investing in environ-
mental issues, including through industry associations and 
fora such as the World Economic Forum.
 There are new environmental challenges and emerging op-
portunities: population growth, changing consumption and 
production patterns, advances in the technology available 
for exploiting nature as well as for its rehabilitation, etc.
3
“…the ability of an enhanced UNEP or successor organization to meet these objectives 
will depend not only on which option is chosen, but on a range of architectural features… 
Such architectural details need to be discussed and decided with their objectives in mind”
Figure 1. Number of Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements. 
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library
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Proposals for Reform
While the focus of the current debate is on institutional form, 
simply choosing one of the options will not in itself resolve all 
the pertinent needs of a new environmental governance re-
gime or entity. For instance, the cross-cutting nature of the en-
vironment – both thematically and through the broad range of 
tools used to address environmental issues – is such that any 
new entity’s relationship with a wide range of other bodies is 
critical. For example:
 For national-level capacity building, the relationship with 
UNDP (among others) is essential.
 For better connecting high-level policy advice with financ-
ing for the environment, the relationship with the GEF and 
the World Bank is essential, including in setting priorities for 
financing.
 For the effective implementation of decisions of a cross-
sectoral nature, an interrelationship with entities as diverse 
as the FAO, ILO, WHO, WMO, INTERPOL, UNODC, WCO, 
WTO, OECD, the World Economic Forum, and the Interna-
tional Tropical Timber Organization, etc., is required. 
 As the lead entity for the environmental dimension of sus-
tainable development, interaction with the UNGA, ECOSOC 
and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (or 
its successor) is required.
 For effective and coherent implementation of the core 
MEAs, a programmatic interrelationship with MEAs ad-
dressing biodiversity, hazardous substances (chemicals and 
waste), and climate change, etc. will be critical.
These interrelationships cannot be directly resolved through 
the negotiation of an UNGA resolution or a treaty. For example, 
any formal interrelationship among the MEAs will need to be 
negotiated with each of the respective COPs, where parties will 
sometimes differ – as they will with other entities, and in par-
ticular those not falling under the authority of the UNGA, such 
as the GEF.
Any reform could address these details, and seek to fulfill the 
desired objectives of the UN system, regardless of which insti-
tutional form is ultimately adopted. The five objectives iden-
tified in the Belgrade Process document serve as a good way 
of identifying possible specific reforms aimed at achieving this 
end. In assessing these options, therefore, reference is made to 
“the new Environment entity” as a neutral term.
At the core of these possible reforms is the need for a more 
authoritative, accountable, and cost-effective entity, one that 
is better able to connect science with policy and policy with 
financing, can enhance more coherent and effective implemen-
tation efforts, and can provide meaningful direction and guid-
ance to the entire UN system and beyond. They are also about 
making a shift from an era characterized by international nego-
tiations to one focused on national implementation.
a) Creating a strong, credible, and accessible  
science base and policy interface
Proposal: The current UNEP Global Environment Outlook 
(GEO) process could be enhanced to provide a broad-based 
“landscape view” of the environmental science base and policy 
platform. The process could draw upon the contribution made 
through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and (in the future) by the Intergovernmental Platform 
for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) to the science 
base and policy interface, as well as the environmental analy-
sis of many bodies within and outside of the UN system. This 
enhancement would be in line with the mandate for GEO-5, 
which now includes a more explicit policy component.
The cycle of adopting and publishing GEO could coincide with 
the three- to four-yearly meetings of the governing body of the 
new Environment entity (see below), giving substance to the 
meetings of the governing body and providing a compass for 
setting financing and programmatic directions.
In addition to influencing financing priorities, the adoption of 
the GEO could be timed to enable it to inform the development 
of strategies for the relevant replenishment cycle of the GEF. 
And in order to help set system-wide programmatic priorities, 
it could facilitate the development or review of a UN system-
wide plan for the environment (see below).
b) Developing a global authoritative and responsive 
voice for environmental sustainability
Proposal: Universal membership of the governing body of the 
environmental entity could be instituted to give it greater po-
litical legitimacy, particularly during an era where MEAs and 
financing mechanisms have universal, or near-universal, mem-
bership. Similarly, it could link agenda and priority-setting for 
financing and systemwide planning to the adoption of major 
scientific reports and policy statements in order to increase re-
sponsiveness and scientific legitimacy.
However, a distinction must be drawn between the authorita-
tive voice that sets the global agenda, and the management 
oversight function, which can be served by a smaller manage-
ment board to provide effective oversight of the secretariat. 
There is also a need for a secretariat that can work effectively 
across the UN system, which may require a strong voice and 
presence in UN Headquarters in New York.
The new Environment entity governing body could have uni-
versal membership and meet once every three to four years7 in 
Nairobi to:
 Adopt GEO on a three- to four-yearly cycle – after an inter-
governmental process.
 Formally transmit GEO to the UNGA, CSD (or its successor), 
the World Bank, GEF, etc. as setting out agreed global envi-
ronment priorities.
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 Review the outcomes of MEA COPs (voluntary outcome 
reports could be submitted by MEAs through their secre-
tariats), consider issues of common interest, determine how 
to facilitate and support national implementation of COP 
decisions, and assess gaps and appropriate measures to fill 
them.
 Convene the Presidents/Chairs of MEA governing bodies, as 
well as their executive heads, and make recommendations 
to forthcoming MEA COPs on enhancing national imple-
mentation, including through joint actions.
 Monitor UN and MEA financing, capacity building, and 
technology-transfer efforts for the environment.
 Review state compliance with environmental commitments 
on a purely voluntary basis – with states that submit to a 
voluntary review being eligible for additional financial sup-
port, including through the GEF, to enable them to come 
into compliance as necessary.
 Support state-to-state capacity building and technology-
transfer efforts on the basis of north-north, south-south, 
north-south, and south-north cooperation.
 Convene a broad-based stakeholder forum on the environ-
ment and engage with such stakeholders in an open and in-
teractive manner, as appropriate.
The governing body meeting could be timed to be back-to-
back with the GEF Assembly. The governing body could be 
complemented by a management board of a limited number 
of members (around 30 – the same as UNDP) established for 
management oversight functions, which could meet twice a 
year. Management board meetings could be held in Nairobi, 
with one meeting being held in New York every one or two 
years (noting UNICEF, UNDP, and UNFPA have an executive 
board session in Geneva every second year). In addition, joint 
sessions could be organized between UNDP’s governing board 
and the Environment entity’s management board in New York 
to address matters of common interest, and in particular na-
tional-level capacity building.8
c) Achieving effectiveness, efficiency and  
coherence within the United Nations system
Proposal: A UN systemwide plan for the environment could 
be prepared to better align all parts of the UN system and oth-
ers in working toward achieving results on agreed priorities. It 
could be prepared by the UN Environment Management Group 
(EMG) (membership includes all relevant UN entities as well 
as major Global MEAs) and provide a common overarching 
strategy and set of programmatic goals and targets.9 It could 
be adopted by the governing body for the new Environment 
entity every three to four years (see above) and be transmitted 
to the UNGA. The EMG could also reach out to major intergov-
ernmental organizations, NGOs, and foundations to determine 
how the efforts of the UN and such stakeholders could comple-
ment one another.
The Secretariat for the EMG could be formally brought within 
the new Environment entity (at present it is notionally outside), 
and the new Environment entity could have a modus operandi 
that is closer to that of the EMG. The EMG could come under 
the direct authority of the UN Chief Executives Board, in a simi-
lar fashion to the UN Development Group, and be chaired by 
the executive head of the new Environment entity (currently 
chaired by UNEP). The Biodiversity Liaison Group (compris-
ing the executive heads of six biodiversity-related conventions) 
could be restructured to come under the EMG, while still also 
reporting on its activities to relevant COPs. Similar groups 
could be established for the other thematic clusters of MEAs, 
as appropriate.
The new Environment entity could have a Nairobi-based execu-
tive head at Under-Secretary-General (USG) level (as is the case 
with UNEP), a New York Office, and a representative office in 
Geneva at levels that reflect the significance of these offices, 
namely, with leaders at the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) 
level and D2 level, respectively. Locating the new Environment 
entity in Nairobi would build upon existing human resources 
and physical infrastructure.
In addition to being an authoritative voice, the new Environ-
ment entity could direct its energy toward programmatic co-
herence at global and regional levels and support of national-
level implementation, with a strong regional programmatic 
presence and selected liaison offices, but no permanent coun-
try programmatic presence. It could take the lead in addressing 
regional environmental initiatives and connecting to regional 
processes, while programmatic county presence could be 
served by UNDP or other appropriate entities. The new entity 
and UNDP could jointly fund and recruit environmental spe-
cialists to enhance country-level implementation of environ-
mental commitments through UNDP country offices.
The new Environment entity may be best served not adminis-
tering any MEAs (noting that UNEP is, in essence, a UNON-ad-
ministered Programme), which could be administered directly 
by UNON and the UN Office at Geneva (UNOG) and report to 
the relevant Director-General through the UN’s performance-
appraisal system (ePAS) to ensure that delivery of the program 
is in line with UN rules.
The UN Secretary-General could be asked to amend the rele-
vant UN rules as they apply to staff of all MEA secretariats, and 
in particular to enable MEA COPs and subsidiary governance 
bodies to have a more direct role in the recruitment of the ex-
ecutive head and in his/her performance appraisal on delivery 
against the COP-approved work program.
In response to calls to better streamline and coordinate MEA 
administration,10 appropriate convention secretariats could be 
clustered thematically, e.g., a chemicals and waste cluster sec-
retariat. Such secretariats could be considered to service new 
clusters of MEAs, with:
 An atmosphere cluster secretariat to service the UNFCCC 
and its protocol(s), and the Montreal Protocol and Multilat-
eral Fund.
“In addition to being an authoritative voice, the new Environment entity 
could direct its energy toward programmatic coherence at global and 
regional levels and support of national-level implementation…”
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 A biodiversity cluster secretariat to service the CBD and its 
protocols, CITES, Ramsar, CMS and its protocols. Cluster-
ing could first be considered for the CITES and CMS Secre-
tariats, two species-based conventions with a long history of 
cooperation, and both located in Europe (Geneva and Bonn, 
respectively).
 FAO ( food and food security) and UNESCO (cultural, natu-
ral, intangible, and movable heritage) already serve as clus-
ters for the biodiversity-related MEAs they administer, and 
hence the World Heritage Convention and International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
are not included in the biodiversity cluster.
 Small nodes of specialist technical staff could be retained to 
service the particular specialist needs of each convention, 
similar to the arrangement for CBD protocols, with all other 
administrative/ICT/finance services being centralized to 
service the cluster.
The biodiversity cluster MEAs could meet back-to-back and/or 
simultaneously11 on a three-yearly COP cycle, with chemicals 
and waste following a similar cycle – resulting in considerable 
cost savings. In addition, reducing the number of COPs by mov-
ing away from two-yearly to three-yearly cycles (as is the case 
with CITES) could help emphasize implementation rather than 
negotiation.
UNON/UNOG could establish and offer common conference 
services support to MEAs on a voluntary basis and with a fi-
nancial incentive to participate. Climate negotiations could be 
oriented around one location servicing permanent missions, 
similar to the WTO.
The new Environment entity could be mandated to focus on 
programmatic system-wide coherence,12 and support for na-
tional-level implementation of commitments/decisions taken 
under MEAs – including raising the required resources, under-
taking joint initiatives, and reinforcing links to sustainable de-
velopment.
d) Securing sufficient, predictable, and coherent 
funding
Proposal: The GEF could become an environmental fund, de-
linked from the need for global environmental benefits, to bet-
ter support national implementation efforts. The new criteria 
could be the provision of funding for the national implementa-
tion of international commitments for the environment under 
any global MEA13 – recognizing that a global convention by 
definition must involve global benefits. Where funding is linked 
to a state’s voluntary review of compliance with environmental 
commitments (see above), it could be fast-tracked in order to 
assist the state to come into compliance. The review could be 
conducted under the authority of the new Environment entity.
To ensure effective linkages between policy and financing, GEO 
outcomes could be formally acknowledged by the GEF as the 
primary source of advice on setting GEF strategies. The GEO 
could also be formally transmitted by the governing body to the 
World Bank and all other financing institutions as the primary 
source of policy guidance on financing environmental initia-
tives, while the new entity could monitor all such financing and 
make appropriate recommendations based on the GEO.
The Executive Director of the new Environment entity could 
have a formal substantive role within the GEF governance 
structure to provide advice on priority setting, based upon 
GEO, as an ex-officio non-voting member of the Council. A 
reciprocal arrangement with the new Environment entity’s 
governing body could be considered for the CEO of the GEF. In 
addition, the GEF Assembly could meet back to back with the 
new Environment entity governing body, with one joint session 
of both bodies. Meetings could alternate between Nairobi and 
elsewhere for this purpose.
e) Ensuring a responsive and cohesive approach 
to meeting country needs
Proposal: UNDP could be clearly accepted as the lead entity 
on national-level programmatic capacity-building for the en-
vironment, including for implementing the Bali Strategic Plan 
for Capacity Building and Technology Support (BSP) (or its 
successor), while the new Environment entity could be clearly 
accepted as the lead in addressing regional programmatic en-
vironmental initiatives and connecting to regional processes, 
with UNEP/UNDP staff being co-located in regional offices 
where possible.
The new Environment entity and MEAs could be mandated to 
provide specialized, targeted national-level capacity-building 
support in defined technical areas. The new Environment en-
tity would not duplicate UNDP country offices, but work with 
them in employing country-based environment specialist staff 
(see above), and enhance its regional interrelationship and re-
gional environmental leadership role.
The new Environment entity’s management board and UNDP’s 
Executive Board could hold joint annual or two-yearly sessions 
in New York (see above) to address issues of common interest, 
such as to approve and review environment work plans, includ-
ing support to the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF) and National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plans (NBSAP) processes, etc., as well as adopt environ-
mental capacity-building strategies.
UNDP/UNEP governing/management boards could convene 
the nominees of the:
 President and executive head of the CSD (or its successor) 
and presidents/chairs/executive heads of key natural re-
sources management agencies such as FAO, to participate in 
joint sessions to address the links between capacity-building 
needs for environment and sustainable development.
 Presidents/Chairs of MEA governing bodies, as well as their 
executive heads, and of IPCC and (proposed) IPBES, to par-
ticipate in joint sessions to address the identified capacity-
building needs of Parties under MEAs and how these can 
be addressed through the environment workplans/NBSAP/
7
UNDAF/capacity-building strategies to be developed and 
approved by UNDP/UNEP.
 Presidents and executive heads of major international orga-
nizations, NGOs, and foundations to determine how they can 
complement one another in their capacity-building efforts.
Conclusion
Rio+20 is a moment in time when the direction of environ-
mental governance for the decades ahead will be determined 
– whether it be retaining the status quo, fundamental reform, 
or something in between. Whatever direction is taken will have 
significant implications for how States collectively address 
both current and future sustainable development challenges 
and opportunities.
This brief offers various ideas for practical reform as a contribu-
tion toward the current debate on environmental governance, 
in the context of the institutional framework for sustainable 
development. Made in a personal capacity, these suggestions 
represent some specific measures that could be considered, ei-
ther individually or collectively, when further refining options 
for international environmental governance reform.
Which of the major structural options currently under con-
sideration, if any, governments choose depends on a number 
of preferences, including the desired level of independence of 
the new Environment entity. Articulating some of the risks and 
benefits associated with the different options may help inform 
the negotiations. Regardless of structural preferences, incor-
porating some of these proposals into any decisions made at 
Rio+20 could help ensure that any changes make best use of 
existing resources and structures in effectively fulfilling the 
functional objectives identified through the Belgrade Process 
outcome, recognizing that governance reform is ultimately a 
means to an end, and not the end in itself.
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2 UNEP 2009b, 2010b.
3 The two options are included as alternatives (para. 51 and para. 51 alt.) in the Rio+20 zero-draft outcome document: UNCSD (2012). The 
Future We Want. Zero-draft of the outcome document for consideration by member states and other stakeholders. 10 January 2012. Avail-
able at: www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/370The%20Future%20We%20Want%2010Jan%20clean%20_no%20brackets.pdf
4 Paragraph 7 of the Belgrade Process. UNEP (2009a).
5 A UNEO was originally put forward as a specialized agency. However, based on the precedent of UNIDO, it could be created instead as a 
subsidiary entity of the UNGA (as UNEP is currently), despite being named an “Organization”; in that case, it would be akin to the latter, 
enhanced-UNEP option.
6 Exclusively voluntarily funded, meaning receiving no regular budget. The Committee is the main subsidiary organ of the Economic and 
Social Council and the UNGA for planning, programming, and coordination. For more information see: www.un.org/en/ga/cpc/about.
shtml
7 The existing UNEP Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF) has universal “participation” and meets on an annual basis. Moving to 
universal membership and a three- to four-year cycle could also result in savings. The IUCN World Conservation Congress now meets once 
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8 Joint meetings would not be a new precedent. A recent UNDP Executive Board meeting has included a joint segment bringing together UN 
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9 The fact that 42 entities across the system have environment programs is a success. However, there is no one overarching framework 
against which multiple inputs can be measured or through which programmatic overlaps or gaps can be assessed. Lessons can be learned 
from past practice and from the recent Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and Aichi Biodiversity Targets adopted at CBD COP 10 that seek to 
speak systemwide. For a brief history, see, for example: www.cites.org/eng/news/SG/2011/20110909_SG_IISD_art.php
10 Noting that “synergies” should also be considered from the programmatic, financing, and the UN systemwide (and beyond) perspective, as 
is addressed elsewhere in this brief. See also: www.cites.org/eng/news/SG/2012/20120221_UNEP-GMEF.php
11 If meeting simultaneously, non-parties to any MEA would remain as observers, similar to what occurs with CBD and its protocols (and as 
has occurred at the simultaneous COPs of the chemicals and waste conventions).
12 Such a role could be achieved through the governing body with universal membership, the systemwide plan, an enhanced GEO, the CEB/
EMG (and role of BLG, etc. within the EMG), etc. – see above.
13 The issues of climate change and ozone (and the Multilateral Fund) may need to be addressed differently.
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